Merci des liens....

Il y a évidemment ce bémol, dans le premier article (gwu) :

"Orlov’s description of the order to assemble the nuclear torpedo is controversial and the other submarine commanders do not believe that that Savitsky would have made such a command.

Soviet submarine commanders were highly disciplined and unlikely to use nuclear weapons by design, but the unstable conditions on board raised the spectre of an accident. Orlov himself believes that the major danger was not from the unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon but from an accident caused by the interaction of men and machines under the most trying of circumstances. Captain Joseph Bouchard, the author of a major study on Naval operations during the missile crisis, supports this point when he suggests that the « biggest danger » was not from « deliberate acts » but from accidents, such as an accidental torpedo launch.(8) If the Soviets had used nuclear torpedoes, by accident or otherwise, the U.S. would have made a "nuclear counter-response."(9) U.S. aircraft carriers had nuclear depth charges on board, while non-nuclear components (all but the fissile material pit) for more depth charges were stored at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see document 49). Fortunately, the U.S. and Soviet leadership, from heads of state to naval commanders wanted to avoid open conflict ; cool heads, professionalism, and some amount of luck, kept the crisis under control."

Mais en somme...

- Les Américains ignoraient l’existence des torpilles équipées de charges nucléaires....

- Les Soviétiques pensaient que les mines étaient chargées...

On a eu chaud....